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The fragmentary, in all its guises, has long been positioned on the margins of literature 
and philosophy. Disparaged alternatively as a writing of incomplete shards, whimsical 
proclamations, arrogant maxims or totalizing dicta, its ruptured, contradictory form 
has also been embraced as the embodiment of broken eras, an escape from the false 
illusion of completion and an opening to the aleatory. The fragment’s brevity precludes 
systematic exposition or narrative development, and as such it has been interpreted 
as a form of interruption and rupture, of authority and totalization, or an ironic 
negotiation between the two. Thus, for Francis Bacon the aphorism’s pithiness and lack 
of development rendered it knowledge in flux, encouraging further engagement and 
refinement: ‘[K]nowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; 
but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance be further 
polished and illustrated and accommodated for use and practice; but it increaseth no 
more in bulk and substance.’1 For Friedrich Schleiermacher, however, the fragment’s 
independence aped authority and encouraged simplification, as ‘from disconnected 
pieces … or only masses capriciously and unnaturally separated from the whole 
body, [it] professes, notwithstanding, to make Philosophy comprehensible’.2 In either 
form the fragmentary has always been a writing of risk, and at risk – risk that its self-
legitimizing authority will be undone, or risk that its incompletion or rupture will 
become closure. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, the fragment is exposed to ‘the ambiguities 
of a freedom represented simultaneously as disengagement, as a surpassing of all rules 
and of all literary genres, and as a concentration of self-constitution and self-sufficiency. 
Because they are essential to the brevity and discontinuity of the fragmentary form, 
these ambiguities cannot be removed’.3
In the midst of generic debates about the differences between the various appellations 
of the fragmentary – fragment, aphorism, epigram, maxim, dictum, slogan – is a form 
that is always more than just a style and more than a simple questioning of style. It 
is an exploration of writing, signification and being, as at its most fundamental the 
fragmentary performs the complex, contradictory, excessive engagement that takes place 
between singularity, totality, system and meaning. With these complexities in mind, this 
chapter explores expositions of the fragmentary that study the form’s impact on thought, 
before moving to a reading of fragmentation as performed in Jacques Derrida’s ‘Che 
cos’è la poesia?’ (1988) and Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Sense of the World (1993).
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***
Embodying ambiguity, the fragmentary can be read as a form of contradictory 
excess, an interposition between opposites. Friedrich Schlegel, the grandfather of 
the fragment, once argued that ‘it’s equally fatal for the mind to have a system and 
to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two’.4 So he turned to the 
fragment, a form embodying ironic negotiation, combination and interruption, and 
whose referral to itself does not enable unity and presence but an interruptive excess 
that, as Jean Baudrillard writes, ‘remains inexhaustible for thought’.5 The play between 
oxymoron and tautology in so many definitions of the fragment performs its excessive 
movement between conjunction and interruption, discourse and silence, and enacts 
the fragment’s overdetermination. Thus for Theodor Adorno the ‘fragment is that part 
of the totality of the work that opposes totality’.6 Similarly, for Friedrich Nietzsche the 
aphorism is ‘too hard for the teeth of time and whole millennia cannot consume it, 
even though it serves to nourish every age: it is thus the great paradox of literature’.7 
Nietzsche’s fragmentary aphorisms cannot be eaten and yet are endlessly nourishing, 
as unchanging as stone and yet applicable to every different generation. Along similar 
lines Maurice Blanchot conceives of the fragmentary as the ‘interruption of the 
incessant’ whereby interruption has ‘the same meaning as that which does not cease’.8 
As such, descriptions of the fragment echo the paradoxical excess that extends beyond 
the fragment from within the fragment, denoting a form which is ‘everywhere sharply 
delimited, but within those limits limitless and inexhaustible; … completely faithful to 
itself, entirely homogeneous, and nonetheless exalted above itself ’.9 A full stop within 
ellipsis, the fragmentary is of limits, liminality and limitlessness.
Although the fragmentary is most commonly understood to perform the 
incompletion and chance relation of signification, the form’s economy and contextual 
fluidity can render its openness a rigid, closed imperative. That is, if the fragment is an 
‘[i]nsaturable context’,10 it is both that which can be endlessly filled and that which is 
resistant to any addition. This ironic ability to take both or either side of a binary is the 
fragment’s strength as well as its weakness and renders the fragment autoimmune, always 
potentially attacking itself. As Derrida writes, ‘[W]hat if the aphorism, like ellipsis, the 
fragment, the “I say almost nothing and take it back immediately”, potentializing the 
mastery of the whole discourse being held back, placing an embargo on all the continuities 
and supplements to come, were sometimes the most violent didactic authority?’11 This 
concern is echoed by Blanchot, who argues that once the fragment turns on itself in 
perfect enclosure there is ‘something sombre, concentrated, obscurely violent about 
it, something that makes it resemble the crimes of Sade’.12 When Zygmunt Bauman 
describes modernity in terms of fragmentation, he deliberately employs its ambiguities 
to designate false order and assimilation and thereby to signal a certain perversion 
within the contemporary. He writes: ‘Modernity prides itself on the fragmentation of the 
world as its foremost achievement. Fragmentation is the prime source of its strength. The 
world that falls apart into a plethora of problems is a manageable world.’13 Modernity, for 
Bauman, is embodied by biopolitical control through categorization and classification, 
and fragmentation in this instance creates isolated, contained concepts as objects of 
containment and observation. In separating an individual, object, genre, structure, 
era or nation from the complex web of connections from which it arose, we give the 
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illusion of a world comprising discrete objects of knowledge, with stable beginnings 
and endings and traceable causes and effects. But the world, as Bauman argues, is not 
orderly; an illusory mode of controlled fragmentation can make it seem so, but this 
is a deception. Neither being, meaning, nor fragments are units to be separated and 
then neatly slotted back into place; all are of an extra-systemic excess, whose multiple 
connections, liminal borders and intersections render them complex, interlocked and 
chaotic. Order is not the dominant sign of modernity, but desire, not least of all desire 
for a logically, rationally, scientifically comprehensible whole of orderly parts, a longing 
that stems from an anxious awareness of its impossibility. It is, after all, the fragment’s 
incompletion that engenders desire and its structure of projection that enables longing.
In playing with the fragment’s tendency to move between ordered separation and 
chaotic relation, Bauman points to the form’s most fundamental negotiation: between 
the avowal and disavowal of totalization. Colloquially, ‘fragment’ denotes a part 
severed from a pre-existing whole – a scrap of pottery, a section of an ode, a portion 
of a painting – but the term also designates a form that failed to be completed, as 
interruption, intellectual impasse or death intervened. Both of these forms presume, or 
at least desire, wholeness, but either lost it or failed to achieve it, and so the fragment 
embodies a discourse of mourning for lost unity, value and relation, and a rhetoric 
of ruptures, wounds and failures. It is from this position that Linda Nochlin reads 
Fuseli’s Artist Overwhelmed by the Grandeur of Antique Ruins as depicting modernity’s 
‘irrevocable loss, poignant regret for lost totality, … vanished wholeness’.14 Of course, 
the ruin and incompletion of involuntary fragmentation lead, perhaps inevitably, 
to the deliberate adoption of the fragment as a deliberate performance of ruin and 
incompletion, and so, as Schlegel wrote, ‘many of the works of the ancients have 
become fragments. Many modern works are fragments as soon as they are written’.15
Late modernity was not, however, the birthplace of appreciation for the ruin, nor 
origin of a form of manufactured incompletion. As Leonard Barkan argues, the Italian 
Renaissance saw the creation of deliberate fragments: ‘The non finito is not a mere 
romantic anachronism but a real expression of early modern artistic culture.’16 This 
said, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw a rise in the literary and 
philosophical use of the form, so much so that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s naming 
of the fragment as ‘the romantic genre par excellence’17 applies to Romanticism across 
Europe and the fragmentary in all its guises. While for Schlegel the fragmentary 
represented a new negotiation between classicism and a contemporaneity marked 
by infinite becoming, its form was also used innovatively, and derivatively, by 
writers from Keats to Hölderlin, with the nineteenth century seeing hundreds of 
fragmentary poems on the theme of loss, death and ruin published in newspapers 
and periodicals.18 The ruptured was considered an inevitable part of existence, as is 
nicely exemplified in Heather McHugh’s recounting of a Benjamin Haydon anecdote. 
In England, 1817, two men stand before the shattered giants of the Elgin marbles: 
‘“How broken they are, a’ant they?” uttered one. “Yes,” the other answered; “but how 
like life”.’19 Since then, while incompletion and destruction remain, the fragmentary 
form has become less immediately ubiquitous. Outside of the mainstream, however, 
the fragmentary has had a consistent, if avant-garde or anti-institutional, presence in 
the literature and philosophy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. A deliberate 
and self-conscious form of hybridity, rupture and assembly has persisted, ranging from 
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novels of interrupted stream of consciousness to disassembled, physically ruptured 
texts, surrealist montage to postmodern anti-poiesis, modernist quotations to fractal 
hypertexts.20
Once we posit the fragment as the formal embodiment of incompletion, we have 
already stepped from the fragment as representation of the loss of totality to the fragment 
as performance of the absence or impossibility of totality. This is fragmentation as the 
form of a priori rupture, ‘the pulling to pieces (the tearing) of that which never has 
preexisted (really or ideally) as a whole, nor can … ever be reassembled in any future 
presence whatsoever’.21 If fragmentation is to be associated with grief – which is by 
no means inevitable – then the differences between the forms of the fragment can be 
figured in the difference between mourning and melancholia. If the former mourns 
a lost totality, the latter is a melancholic lamentation for a unity that never existed. 
Totality is understood to be an illusory desire, and modernity becomes marked by 
the loss of that which it never had, an impossible nostalgia for a never experienced 
wholeness. In this case we begin with fragmentation and melancholically acquire the 
dream of the finished work from the shards we have to hand. However, the danger of 
this preconceived fragmentation is, as Hans-Jost Frey argues, that its planned rupture 
might become a form of closure, as ‘that which, by its essence, cannot be finished 
fulfils its essence by remaining unfinished and is thereby whole. Its incompletion is 
in this case explainable and understandable: it stops where it should, at the end’.22 It 
thus becomes the deadening predictability of perfect self-presence and self-relation, 
of the kind that has been read into Schlegel’s most famous definition of the fragment: 
‘[A] fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the 
surrounding world and be complete in itself like a hedgehog.’23 Schlegel’s fragments 
were thought by Blanchot, Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy to be too close to 
‘the closure of a perfect sentence’.24 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argued that the ‘logic 
of the hedgehog’ does not destabilize totality and closure but disseminates it so that 
fragmentary totality is ‘simultaneously in the whole and in each part … identically the 
plural totality of fragments, which does not make up a whole (in, say, a mathematical 
mode) but replicates the whole, the fragmentary itself, in each fragment’.25 That is, from 
their perspective the multiple relations and connections between Schlegel’s fragments 
proliferate totalities rather than negating them. While Schlegel’s fragments present 
totality as an impossible aspiration or an infinite becoming, his anti-systematic system 
is, for these later readers, predicated on a double, synchronized closure and the shifting 
grounds of a progressive, if infinite, becoming. It is in response to this (mis)reading 
that Derrida’s aphorisms designate ‘the memory of a totality, at the same time ruin 
and monument’.26 Totality is neither becoming nor to come, but in the past, a distant 
memory of an illusory closure.
That said, Derrida’s aphorisms play, like Schlegel’s fragments, on the concept of 
the both/and. When he describes his aphorisms as singular and plural, however, we 
see a discourse of disassociation predicated on contamination, one whose complicity 
renders aphorisms neither independently whole – even a whole deferred or to come 
– but contaminated, excessive and interrupted. The structure that we see so often in 
Derrida’s texts is one of the hyphenation of fragmentation: the dual medicine and 
poison of the pharmakon, the double inside and outside of the hymen and tympan, 
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the addition and replacement of the supplement, the conjunction and separation of 
the hyphen. What proliferates in these relations is not system or totality, but excess. 
We can follow this movement in Derrida’s exploration of the relation between the 
systematic and the non-systematic through the architectural and aphoristic. Playing 
on content and form, Derrida prefaces a book on architecture with a series of 
aphorisms. While the architectural implies order, logic, authority and system, all of 
which can be intellectually inhabited, the aphorism is, he writes, usually thought to 
be that which is never wholly self-present, always less than or more than itself – a 
point, a plan, a project, a problem. As such it cannot be occupied or made an object 
of knowledge. However, the aphorism’s seeming isolation and independence makes it 
a self-legitimizing structure, which means that ‘[t]here is nothing more architectural 
than a pure aphorism’.27 Likewise, the architectural is at its most authoritative as a piece 
of architecture, rather than a building with a purpose, when it revokes the traditional 
demands of the edifice, ‘when it does everything to save itself [faire économie] a 
structural demonstration’.28 The architectural/systematic cannot thereby shore itself up 
on length, argument and style, presuming itself thus impregnable, as the system shares 
the fragment’s contradictions and incompletion. Conversely, the aphoristic partakes of 
much of the system’s self-justification. Derrida thus reveals the contamination between 
supposed opposites, and we arrive, without closure, at the oxymoronic tautology of the 
architectural aphorism.
Taking this structural contamination further, Groarke argues that the sudden insight 
or burst of inspiration associated with a fragmentary form is precisely the inductive 
logic that underpins classical philosophy. Thus for Plato dialectic leads to a burst of 
intuitive, aphoristic comprehension, while for Aristotle inductive, inspirational first 
principles lead to retrospective deductive logic. Tracing the structure of thought in 
Plotinus, Aquinas and Pascal, Louis Groarke positions philosophy on the fractured 
foundations of the aphorism, ‘the kind of memorable, terse expression that can only 
come about through a nonargumentative act of cognition or intellection’.29 However, in 
moving from the contamination of the system and non-system to the (re)appropriation 
of the non-systematic into the system, do we not work against the radical potentiality 
of the fragmentary by further institutionalizing it? Does it become graffiti sprayed on 
an officially sanctioned wall, its potential for revolutionary critique of forms of thought 
impoverished? Or do fragments, in the process of reading, tend inevitably to the 
systematic and the homogenized? To the last question we surely have to answer ‘yes’ 
but must also understand that the dynamism, contradictions and imperfect negotiation 
associated with fragments prevent any final, normalizing recuperation. Movement can 
take place in varied directions without leading to a closure of assimilation; there is 
always a shifting, protean relation that prevents there being a final step.
Furthermore – there is always another step with the fragmentary, a pas au-delà – 
perhaps a certain thinking of ‘open totality’ is now necessary. For many who wrote 
in the wake of the world wars, absolute systems and ideologies of unity were deeply 
tainted by violence and totalitarianism. I raise this point with some trepidation, but 
totality does not necessarily have to be malignant. For Timothy Morton, a thinking 
of totality is necessary for us to envisage and be positioned within the closed system 
we are swiftly destroying. Thus Morton turns from an othered, isolated nature to the 
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‘ecological view’, a fragmentary sense of relation that recognizes the ‘vast, sprawling 
mesh of interconnection without a definite centre or edge. It is a radical intimacy, 
coexistence with other beings, sentient or otherwise’.30 Following the structure of the 
fragmentary, the mesh is of ‘the holes in a network and threading between them. It 
suggests both hardness and delicacy … Since everything is interconnected, there is 
no definite background and therefore no definite foreground’.31 The mesh names an 
interdependence of risk and threat, as it forces us to realize the instability of our position 
and our potential loss. Morton argues that the excess of fragments’ connections does 
not make the protean whole more than the sum of its parts, but rather a unity full of at-
risk, interconnected life. While this totality might arise from our incomplete, lacking, 
interconnected selves, it is nonetheless a closed system. There is no outside or escape, 
and thus for Morton a refusal to think in terms of totality and closure is dangerous, as 
it presumes we can evade the damage we have done. We need to recognize that ‘“[t]
otality” doesn’t mean something closed, single, and independent, nor does it mean 
something predetermined and fixed; it has no goal’.32 Totality might be inescapable, but 
a fragmentary, ecological view can perhaps be used to move beyond it from within it, 
by changing it and the world’s fate.
But perhaps we are getting ahead of ourselves. In a discourse on fragmentation, it is 
impossible not to. To return to the avoidance of pure self-relation, the fragment must 
be of interruption and rupture without this embodiment being its essence. It must 
fail to be perfect incompletion, without that failure becoming its dominant sign. Its 
content and form should be
precisely the language that is not entirely language, not entirely itself but something 
other than, and different from language itself: a fragment would be that in which 
the face of language passed behind or beyond it; a fragment would be the language 
in which something other than itself – nothing, for example – also spoke and, 
therefore, a language in which at least two languages always spoke – a broken 
language, the break of language.33
This broken language, which Blanchot describes as a ‘faintness faintly murmuring: 
what remains without remains’,34 is the whispering of near failure, a haunting by 
the impossible, pure fragment that can never be without causing fragmentation to 
complete, and thereby extinguish, itself. Thus the fragment operates at its own limits, 
never quite realizing its own fragmentation. As Schlegel writes, ‘as yet no genre exists 
that is fragmentary both in form and in content, simultaneously completely subjective 
and individual, and completely objective and like a necessary part in a system of all 
the sciences’.35 Instead the fragmentary produces a speech ‘whose task is not to say 
things (not to disappear in what it signifies), but to say (itself) in letting (itself) say, yet 
without taking itself as the new object of this language without object’.36 In never quite 
realizing itself, the fragment lives on – its spaces, ambiguities and excesses a resistance 
that for Schlegel performs an infinite becoming, for Blanchot an infinite unworking 
(désoeuvrement) and for Derrida an infinite coming.
As ‘a play of limits in which no limitation plays’37 fragments’ content and form are a 
writing of blanks and spaces. That is, fragments are
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unfinished separations … For fragments, destined partly to the blank that separates 
them, find in this gap not what ends them, but what prolongs them, or what makes 
them await their prolongation – what has already prolonged them, causing them 
to persist on account of their incompletion. And thus they are always ready to let 
themselves be worked upon by indefatigable reason, instead of remaining as fallen 
utterances, left aside, the secret void of mystery which no elaboration could ever 
fill.38
The gap between fragments is not a boundary that concludes and isolates, but a 
paratactic space engendering changing, aleatory signification. The lacunae that figure 
between fragments and aphorisms are paths that allow for an infinite number of 
routes to be taken between fragments and hence an infinite possibility of readings: 
‘[a]phorism: that which hands over every rendezvous to chance’.39 At the same 
time, however, the caesuras present an unbridgeable abyss between fragments as 
the fragments are too isolated to be in opposition or contradiction. A collection of 
aphorisms presents ideas that can radically refute or consolidate an argument; these 
agreements or resistances are not, however, part of a set system, and any attempt to 
systematize them should recognize that the system is imposed and wholly born from 
the act of reading. The aphorism is thus always in a series, hyphenated internally 
with the array of all its potential meanings, and externally, with a changing, random 
selection of other aphorisms. Hence the fragmentary proffers synecdoches – parts of 
a whole – that point to the general absence of a stable, uncontaminated whole, be it of 
the thing itself, or that from which it supposedly originated.
The risk and rupture that Blanchot, in particular, sees in the fragmentary render 
it a form of unending, self-fragmenting poiesis, an unworking which removes the 
fragment from the rational and the product-driven. This is not to say that for Blanchot 
the fragmentary is nihilistic, its openness leading to the absence of position or value. 
Instead, the fragment is in excess of nihilism; it is neither affirmation nor negation nor a 
refusal of both, but an opening that is beyond control.40 Schlegel once wrote, ‘“Nothing 
is yet said.” – <Tout est dit >’.41 For Blanchot, writing ‘belongs to the fragmentary when 
all has been said’42 – when writing is always a rewriting or citation without definitive 
origin, without this exhaustion leading to closure. The fragmentary is not a base or 
a ground on which to form identity and presence, nor is it an other against which to 
position meaning or origin. It is a radical otherness as possibility, where possibility is 
the suspension, interruption, weakness, silence, contingency and referral of writing 
and the self. It is on the non-grounds of the fragmentary, and for Blanchot, the neuter 
and the disaster, that writing and life are possible. As such, the non-essential essence 
of the fragmentary, the neuter and the disaster is a shifting assembly of contradiction, 
impossibility, undecidability, ambiguity, mutability, perilousness and risk.
The serial (il)logic of the fragmentary is such that each ‘aphorism in the series can 
come before or after the other, before and after the other – and in the other series’.43 
Each aphorism is the centre of a series and the border of (another) series, and the 
fragmentary thus introduces a radical temporality in which linear temporality and lines 
of influence are undone. Like the complex inheritance that Derrida maps out between 
Plato and Socrates in ‘Envois’, there is always ‘the one in the other, the one in front of 
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the other, the one after the other, the one behind the other’.44 Linearity, progression 
and teleology come apart as the fragmentary undoes beginnings and endings, and 
cause and effect. The time of inception and disruption are, like Tristram Shandy’s 
conception, contaminated, as fragments interrupt (‘normal’) rhythm, producing an 
off-beat, irregular time, a time out of joint, where, as Hamm says in Beckett’s Endgame, 
‘the end is in the beginning and yet you go on’.45 We thus see in the fragmentary an 
‘exemplary anachrony, the essential impossibility of any absolute synchronisation’,46 
which means that the fragmentary denotes an impossible contemporaneity. No era 
can be complete in itself, or present to itself, as each epoch has its beginnings outside 
of itself. As Giorgio Agamben argues, to be contemporary is to be out of joint with 
one’s own time, to ‘neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust […] to its demands’.47 
Contemporariness is a relationship with one’s time that ‘adheres to it through a 
disjunction and an anachronism. Those who coincide too well with the epoch, those 
who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not contemporaries, precisely because 
they do not manage to see it; they are not able to firmly hold their gaze on it’.48 To be 
contemporary is to be sufficiently disconnected from the age to see it clearly and see 
not that which is in focus but that which is in the dark. To be a contemporary is to 
see that which is out of time, ‘like being on time for an appointment that one cannot 
but miss’.49 In the contrapuntal, non-synchronous relation of the contemporary the 
fragmentary refers to a time which is ‘anterior to all past-present, as well as posterior 
to every possibility of a present yet to come’.50
***
The attributes of the fragmentary that we have discussed – contradiction, excess, 
anachronism, discontinuity, relation, vulnerability, movement, self-legitimization 
and self-interruption – can be further explored in the dialogue between Nancy’s 
conception of the fragmentary and the infinitely finite, and Derrida’s elaboration of 
the poematic and the absolute nonabsolute. While Nancy’s The Sense of the World is 
an engagement with Derrida’s ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’, and Derrida’s ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’ 
is an engagement with the fragmentary, this is a silent, interrupted, unacknowledged 
hyphenation. Derrida denied that his text engaged with the fragmentary, and Nancy 
makes no reference to Derrida’s essay. Yet in this section we see a web of connections 
that shift and move through exegetical excess, bringing – despite avowal and disavowal 
– the works of Schlegel, Blanchot, Derrida, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe together. Each 
echoes the other; each – in a performance of fragmentary lines of double inheritance 
– influences and provokes the other.
In ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’ Derrida formulates the poematic as that which is neither 
process nor product, never the object of thetic knowledge, but ‘the aleatory rambling 
of a trek, the strophe, that turns but never leads back to discourse, or back home’.51 The 
poematic is never an event but the ‘advent of an event’52 and thus is the permanent 
coming or endlessly delayed arrival of determination. Its haphazard forays across the 
road lead to infinite commentary but will always resist a final, thetic word. Derrida 
gives to the poematic the body of the hedgehog, a sliver of life that turns in on itself only 
to imperil itself, an animal of defensive vulnerability hidden under the false protection 
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of spines, a thing ‘which in the same stroke exposes itself to death and protects itself ’.53 
Derrida’s poematic hedgehog of course recalls Schlegel’s hedgehog fragment, and yet 
Derrida states quite categorically in ‘Istrice 2: Ick bünn all hier’ that his hedgehog is 
not Schlegel’s. Despite this denial, however, the vulnerability, alterity, impurity and 
tautology that Derrida embodies in the hedgehog poematic are of the fragmentary 
– a sibling of Blanchot’s fragments, a cousin of Schlegel’s. Derrida’s creature ‘has no 
relation to itself – that is, no totalising individuality – that does not expose it even 
more to death and to being-torn-apart’.54 It is, writes Derrida, not a moment of self-
relating production, but that which ‘lets itself be done, without activity, without work, 
in the most sober pathos, a stranger to all production, especially to creation’.55 It is the 
ruin of a totality that never existed, an assortment of paratactic phrases that longs to 
exist rather than represent, to simply be, ‘without external support, without substance, 
without subject, absolute of writing in (it)self ’.56 Blanchot describes the German 
romantic project in almost identical terms, depicting it as that which introduced
the work’s power to be and no longer to represent; to be everything, but without 
content or a content that is almost indifferent, and thus at the same time affirming 
the absolute and the fragmentary; affirming totality, but in a form that, being all 
forms – that is, at the limit, being none at all – does not realise the whole, but 
signifies it by suspending it, even breaking it.57
As Blanchot continues, for the Romantics ‘to speak poetically is to make possible 
a non-transitive speech whose task is not to say things (not to disappear in what it 
signifies), but to say (itself) in letting itself say, yet without taking itself as the new 
object of this language without object’.58 The consanguinity of the hedgehogs is clear, 
and even more so when Derrida employs a formulation of oxymoronic relation to 
singularity and totality: the ‘absolute nonabsolute’, which is later echoed in Nancy’s 
‘infinitely finite’.
As I have argued elsewhere, the poematic, as the absolute nonabsolute, is a longing for 
absolute inseparation, a paradoxical, fragmentary desire that is expressed by Derrida 
through entangling formulations of tautologous and oxymoronic contamination.59 He 
writes: ‘Literally: you would like to retain by heart an absolutely unique form, an event 
whose intangible singularity no longer separates the ideality, the ideal meaning as one 
says, from the body of the letter. In the desire of this absolute inseparation, the absolute 
nonabsolute, you breathe the origin of the poetic.’60 The ‘absolute’, we recognize, is 
self-referential, unconditional and totalized, while the ‘nonabsolute’ is contingent, 
conditional and inseparable from the other. The absolute, as itself and as theory, exegesis 
and performance of itself, contains itself and that which is more than or different from 
itself and is thus a priori nonabsolute. In a similar movement, if the nonabsolute is 
a referral always to the other, it then incorporates everything and acquires a certain 
completion. As such, the absolute nonabsolute refers to itself through the other and in 
referring to the other refers to itself. It is an identity predicated on difference, a drive 
to embody alterity and to extinguish alterity, to relate to itself through singular alterity 
such that it ceases to be.
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For Nancy the fragment is, like the poematic, vulnerable, a murmuring. It 
‘vacillates … between its own decay and a future coming of its devolution. Between its 
failure and its chance, art begins once again’.61 The fragment is thus not that which has 
fallen off but is a vulnerable, chance befalling – its protection an exposure, its exposure 
also its strength. As Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe write elsewhere, echoing Blanchot, 
‘[t]he fragment is indestructible, which is to say that destruction is assured’.62 Like 
Derrida’s poematic hedgehog, Nancy’s fragment is inextirpable because it is already 
a fragility, a whispering, a trembling. The fragment exists as the plea/imperative ‘noli 
me frangere’: ‘Don’t shatter me, don’t fragment me.’63 The phrase does not voice a fear 
of separation or disintegration but a quiet request/dictation: ‘[D]on’t wish to fragment 
me – fragmentation goes on, and I’m fragmented enough; anyway, it’s not up to you.’64 
Fragmentation is always a priori and is not a tool that can be picked up and then put 
down. Inherent, of course, in Nancy’s noli me frangere is the noli me tangere that Jesus 
utters in John’s gospel – don’t touch me as you cannot touch me, and because you 
don’t know what it is you would be touching. This injunction also contains a warning: 
don’t break me down into pieces you can understand; don’t make me an object of 
perception, because what you will arrive at is not me.
For Nancy, fragmentary art as exemplary of a fragmentary existence is predicated on 
the openness, mutability and exposure of a movement towards – a seemingly intransitive 
phrase whose lack of an enunciated object does not make it a general movement, but 
a specifically localized movement towards an object that is differentiated each time. 
The phrase is, as such, a phrase of fragmentary openness. Being in the world renders 
sense and meaning not an intellectual position but a physical, emotional, dynamic 
relation to or movement towards the world and towards community. Thus ‘the world 
no longer has a sense, but it is sense’,65 as there is no transcendental signifier, grand 
myth or encompassing narrative underpinning meaning. There is just the fractal 
excess of existence as coexistence, of being in the world, or ‘being singular plural’. 
This understanding of the world, sense and being is fragmentary and relational, as we 
are positioned as syntactic fragments in an open chain of excessive relations between 
the absolute and the relative, and the ideal and the material, rather than semantically 
placed within stable truths. As Nancy writes: ‘[T]ruth is semantic, sense is syntactic … 
syntax enchains, enchains itself, involves itself, and carries itself away across semantic 
punctuations … these punctuations in turn have value and validity only insofar as each 
is swept along toward, involved in, and even carried away beyond, the others.’66 Nancy’s 
enchaining is not a restriction but a protean connection of kaleidoscopic fragments 
which are focused on the event, an act or doing, rather than completed works, projects 
or lives. This is because the art fragment, as an expression of being, is not that which 
dedicates itself to sublimation towards a whole or a teleological orientation towards 
a totality. It is, rather, ‘[p]resentation without presentness [présentité], or pres-ense, 
[which] does not transcend any more than it immanates: it comes, it comes and goes’67 
– a communication through concatenations and interruptions of touch and jouissance. 
Art is, as such, ‘a counterpoint without resolution’, ‘open to this fragmentation of sense 
that existence is’.68 Art, sense and the world are, thereby, the relation to, towards and 
between fragments.
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With the absence of a creator, ideology or myth, underpinning sense, what supports 
and gives meaning to the world is the world itself. As such the horizon, frontier or limit 
of the world is the world; there is no transcendental signifier on the other side. The 
world is turned towards itself, but inasmuch for the humble hedgehog on its surface, 
this is not a closure of unity, but rather a fractal or fragmentary excess. Neither the 
fragment nor being carry their end in themselves, as this would constitute an autonomy 
of self-enclosure, where ‘[e]xposition itself ends up as introjection, return to self ’.69 
Instead, we have the ‘[f]ragment: no longer the piece fallen from a broken set, but the 
explosive splintering of that which is neither immanent nor transcendent. The in-finite 
explosion of the finite’.70 Neither ideal nor material, the fragment dwells in ‘the realm 
of essenceless existence. This realm lacks both domain and sovereignty’.71 For Nancy – 
how can we not hear Derrida’s hedgehog here? – the fragmentary is the performance of 
‘the event of being that one also calls existence … [one which] comes and “essentially” 
does nothing but come’.72 The event is then incommensurable with ‘taking place’,73 that 
is, it is absolutely other to the taking place of the event, which means that the event, as 
an occurrence or happening, is incommensurable to itself. If it cannot relate to itself, 
it must then relate to others and be nonabsolute. The singular event which comes is 
nonetheless an event relating to all others, and as such the event is in fragmentary 
relation to Derrida’s absolute inseparation or the absolute nonabsolute.
Nancy positions ‘finitude’ as interruption and noncompletion. But the essence 
of this interrupted and noncomplete finitude cannot be one of privation, because 
absolute or pure privation ‘would annul in itself its own privation, would constitute 
itself immediately as an absolute, having absolutely and without remainder arrived at 
itself, as itself as in itself even before existing, existence not taking place, pure essential 
without esse’.74 As absolute privation cancels itself, the essence of finitude cannot be lack, 
absence, limit, imperfection, fault. For Nancy, finitude denotes instead nonabsolute 
‘ex-istence’, whose mutability, connectivity and existence outside of itself render it 
effectively without essence. Our finitude is not a curling in ourselves, containing our 
beginning and our end, but is being affected by our end as that which is outside or 
beyond us. Hence the fragmentary subject is a ‘being-toward-infinity of what does not 
have its end in itself – does not contain its end – because it is infinitely affected by that 
end’.75 That which carries its end in itself is absolute, ‘finished, achieved, accomplished, 
and perfect, infinitely perfect – [it] is at most pure truth, but truth deprived of sense: 
and it is exactly due to this that God, as such a being, is dead’.76 We are, instead, as living 
fragments,
infinitely finite, infinitely exposed to our existence as a nonessence, infinitely 
exposed to the otherness of our own ‘being’ (or that being is in us exposed to its 
own otherness). We begin and we end without beginning and ending: without 
having a beginning and an end that is ours, but having (or being) them only as 
others’, and through others. My beginning and my end are precisely what I cannot 
have as mine, and what no one can have as his/her own.77
Thus we come to Nancy’s fragmentary definition: ‘That which, for itself, depends on 
nothing, is an absolute. That which nothing completes in itself is a fragment. Being or 
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existence is an absolute fragment. To exist: the happenstance of an absolute fragment.’78 
The absolute does not depend on anything; it is complete in itself. The fragment is never 
completed and as such is nonasbsolute. To exist is to be in the paradoxical relation of 
the absolute fragment, that is, the absolute nonabsolute, the infinitely finite; on the 
chance, unpredictable border between the ideal and the material, the unconditional 
and the conditional, and to exist in relation to the self as other. Of course, Nancy’s 
seemingly laconic definition pivots on the play of ‘nothing’ as a presence of absence 
and an absence of presence. As such, it can be read in reverse, thereby stating that 
the absolute depends on nothing, that is, on difference, absence, isolation, and in 
this dependency is nonabsolute. The fragment is the completion of nothing, that is, 
the self-enclosure of nothing, and is thus the absolute. Going further, as Nancy has 
used the term ‘fragment’ to denote both that which is absolute and nonabsolute, the 
sense of the terms begins to combine and blur, until we are left with happenstance,79  
with existence in the midst of the complex, contradictory and contingent – in all its 
senses – movement of chance, between Nancy, Derrida and the fragmentary.
‘The idea of the book’, writes Derrida, ‘which always refers to a natural totality, 
is profoundly alien to the sense of writing’.80 Hence we ‘have played the post card 
against literature’,81 and turned to the fragment, because, after all, ‘is this interruption 
that condemns one to the aphorism not the condition of every conversation?’82 The 
fragmentary is the contrapuntal relation of interruption that enables signification 
while disrupting it, and in an era of high consumption and consumerism, is there not a 
deep need for a form of thought, writing and being that highlights process and passage 
rather than product and port? A form that doesn’t simulate systematic, completed 
knowledge and ownership of the world, but implicitly acknowledges insufficiency and 
lack. A writing that works to encourage complexity and undercut the segmentation 
of the world into commodified units. A textuality that, in denying full possession and 
interiority, insists that meaning and change will always come. A relation of difference, 
a negotiation between self-sustaining systems and open, free radicals. And so we close 
with the words of Roland Barthes:
Liking to find, to write beginnings, he tends to multiply this pleasure: that is why 
he writes fragments: so many fragments, so many beginnings, so many pleasures 
(but he doesn’t like the ends: the risk of the rhetorical clausule is too great: the fear 
of not being able to resist the last word).83
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